Central Committee, issued his famous "lean-to-one-side" statement:
Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equal and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democratic countries, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.... We must lean to one side. 1 Why did Mao decide to issue such a statement at this particular moment? What was the background as well as the real nature and practical meaning of the CCP's "lean-to-oneside" policy? How did it affect the CCP's foreign policy framework in general and the CCP's policy toward the United States in particular? An answer to these questions will contribute to our comprehension of the environment in which the CCP leadership finally decided to involve China into a direct military confrontation with the United States in late 1950.
Placing the CCP's policy behavior into the international background, it is easy to see that Mao's "lean-to-one-side" statement was a logical outgrowth of the CCP's long-time revolutionary policy of attaching itself to the international progressive forces led by the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, CCP leaders had firmly perceived the postwar world order as divided into two camps, one headed by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States.
They viewed their revolution as an inseparable part of the Soviet-led international proletarian movement and excluded the possible existence of a middle ground between the two camps. 2 It is evident that Mao's "lean-to-one-side" statement was consistent with this comprehension of the postwar world structure. The political implication of Mao's decision was straightforward:
in the international confrontation between the Soviet-led progressive camp and the Americaled reactionary camp, the CCP had no choice but to ally itself with the Soviet Union against the United States. The CCP's "lean-to-one-side" decision was also closely related to China's domestic politics. According to materials now available, different opinions concerning the direction of the new China's domestic and foreign policies existed between some members of procommunist "democratic parties"and the CCP. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and the PRC's first premier and foreign minister, argued that these people "still had illusions of U.S. imperialism," hoping that the new China would be able to maintain a middle path, which was not so radical, in international politics. 7 The opinion of General Zhang Zhizhong, a former close associate of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) who had just joined the Communist side, was typical in this regard. In a discussion with Mao, Zhang suggested that the new China, while uniting with the Soviet Union, should seek accommodation with the United States and other western countries. He believed that such a policy would be in the interests of the Chinese nation. Mao disagreed, arguing that the attempt to pursue the "doctrine of the mean" [zhong yong zhi dao] in international politics would be dangerous to the cause of Chinese Communist revolution because it would weaken the innerdynamics of the Chinese revolution and blur the distinction between revolution and counterrevolution. 8 In order to promote the Chinese Communist revolution at home, Mao believed it essential for Chinese foreign policy to "lean to one side."
As a practical policy choice, Mao's "lean-to-one-side" decision has to be understood within the context of the CCP's efforts to adjust relations with the Soviet Union during the last During the long course of the Chinese Communist revolution, the development of the CCP-Soviet relationship had been tortuous. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the CCP, as a branch of the Soviet-controlled Comintern, had to follow Soviet instructions from time to time. Among the party leadership, sharp disagreements existed between the native section headed by Mao and the international section headed by Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), a Soviettrained orthodox Communist. For a long period, Mao had been stifled by the international section which was supported by Stalin and the Soviet Party. Mao never forgot this experience.
After Mao emerged as the top CCP leader in the late 1930s, he continued to face pressures from the Comintern and the Soviet Union in several occasions. In 1940-41, when Mao refused to follow the Soviet order to use the CCP's military forces to attract the main formation of Japanese troops in China "to protect the Soviet Union," Mao and the CCP leadership were severely criticized by the Comintern. 10 In the early 1940s, the CCP's rectification campaign, a political movement designed to consolidate Mao's leading position in the party, was viewed with suspicious eyes by the Soviet Party and the Comintern, which suspected that the campaign represented an attempt to suppress the pro-Soviet section within the CCP. 11 Even after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, the CCP continued to find its policies, especially its management of the united front with the GMD, from time to time the target of Moscow's criticism. 12 At the Yalta Conference of 1945, Stalin promised to FDR that he would not support the CCP in the internal conflict in China in exchange for FDR's agreement on the independence of Outer Mongolia and other concessions in China. This was obviously a severe offense to the CCP. 13 During the course of the 1946-1949 civil war, CCP-Soviet relations were again inharmonious. While contingently offering the CCP assistance in its confrontation with the GMD, especially in the Northeast area (Manchuria), Soviet leaders generally doubted shijian de huigu, 37). In any case, the timing of Mao's "lean-to-one-side" speech had a close connection with Liu's visit. 10 Yang Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongshan guoji yu zhongguo geming (The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1988, Chapter 5; Liao Ganlong, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution during the Last Stage of the AntiJapanese War and the War of Liberation," Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Study of the CCP History), Supplementary Issue on the Relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution, 1990, 2-4.
11 Liao, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution during the Last Stage of the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation," 4. 12 Ibid., 4-5. 13 Ibid., 5-6; see also Wang Tingke, "The Impact of the Yalta System upon the Relationship between Stalin and the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution," Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Study of the CCP History), Supplementary Issue on the Relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution, 1990, 12-21, especially 15-16. the CCP's ability to win. In spite of the fact that the GMD insistently took a pro-American stand as the Cold War intensified, the Soviet Union remained neutral in the CCP-GMD conflict. Stalin even pressured the CCP to compromise with the GMD, and Soviet media kept a strange silence as CCP forces won a series of crucial military victories. 14 Several Chinese sources point out that in early 1949, Stalin advised Mao and the CCP leadership not to cross the Yangzi River to avert triggering a direct Soviet-American confrontation. Mao firmly rejected this suggestion. 15 As late as late February 1949, after the PLA had forced the GMD government to move from Nanjing to Guangzhou (Canton), the Soviet ambassador remained with the GMD government, transferring to Guangzhou. All this must have made it difficult for the CCP to establish a close strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union. 16 All the above, however, is only one side of the overall picture of the CCP-Soviet relationship. Mao and the the Chinese Communists, in the final analysis, are communists. In the long process of the Chinese Communist revolution, the CCP leadership always kept or tried to keep an intimate relationship with Stalin and the Soviet party. We now know that, except for a short period during the Chinese Red Army's "Long March" from Southern China 16 Mao and other CCP leaders were unhappy with the Soviet attitude toward China's Civil War. Mao stressed on several occasions that "the Chinese revolution achieved its victory against the will of Stalin." Zhou Enlai also observed: "The Soviet policy [toward China's civil war] was largely the result of their erroneous assessment of the international relations at that time. The Soviets were worried that the civil war in China might overturn the established sphere of influence set up by the Yalta conference, thus leading to an American intervention and making the Soviet Union suffer. Stalin was also scared by the prospect of the Third World War. The point of departure of Stalin's policy was to appease the United States [in China] so that the Soviet Union would be guaranteed time necessary for their peaceful reconstruction. The Soviet Union had a strong reservation upon our ability to liberate the whole China.... There existed fundamental divergences between us and the Soviet leaders regarding the international situation as well as our ability to liberate the whole China. This, as Mao saw it later, "would place the People's Republic in a favorable position by forcing those capitalist countries to fit themselves to our principles; foreign countries would be forced to recognize China unconditionally as well as to abolish those old treaties and sign new treaties with us; and those capitalist countries would dare not to take rash actions against us." A new alliance with the Russians was Mao's first priority. 45 As he planned for the visit, Mao considered bringing Zhou Enlai with him if a treaty could be negotiated. 47 Shi Zhe recalled that the Russians meticulously arranged it so that Mao's train arrived at the station exactly at noon so that Mao was welcomed by the ringing clock of the station. Mao's reception by so many high-ranking Soviet official revealed that the Russians wanted to please him. See Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," 12; for a Soviet version of Mao's visit to Moscow (1) We may sign a new Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. This will be very favorable to us. [By doing this], SinoSoviet relations will be consolidated on the basis of the new treaty; China's workers, peasants, intellectuals, and leftist nationalist bourgeois will be greatly encouraged while rightist nationalist bourgeoisie be isolated; internationally we will have more political strength [zhenzhi ziben] to deal with imperialist countries and to examine all treaties signed by China and imperialist countries in the past. (2) We may ask our news agencies to issue a joint communique, only mentioning that our two sides have 55 Not wanting to give the Russians the impression that they were in a hurry to negotiate the treaty, Mao instructed Zhou "to prepare for five days ... and come here by train not by airplane. It is plain to see that the unity of the people of the two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, solidified by the alliance treaty, will be permanent and inviolable, and one which cannot be put asunder by anyone. Moreover, this unity will not only influence the prosperity of these two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, but will surely affect the future of humanity and the triumph of peace and justice all over the world. 59 Zhou Enlai also stated in his departure address that "these treaties and agreements made the Chinese people feel that they were no longer isolated." To the contrary, "they were now much stronger than ever before. For many years we insisted that the initiative for starting the Korean War came from South Korea....I'm telling the truth now for the sake of history: it was the initiative of Comrade Kim Il-sung, and it was supported by Stalin and many others --in fact, by everybody. 62 Although no "hard evidence" in Chinese sources available today will either prove or disprove alone had he released to the Chinese the date of his action. Kim was relying more on the Soviets than on the Chinese. 68 Before further materials about Kim's visit are declassified, we can go no farther than what is offered by these sources. What should be emphasized here is that (1) the simple fact that Kim informed Mao of his intention of attacking the South on his way back from Moscow tells us that both the Soviet Union and China had at least some preknowledge of North Korea's war preparations; and (2) it is far too premature to conclude that Mao and the CCP leadership did not support Kim's intention of attacking the South, as argued by Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai in their generally plausible article on China's decision to enter the Korean War. 69 Otherwise, scholars will feel extremely perplexed to understand why the CCP decided to send as many as 50,000-70,000 Korean-nationality PLA soldiers back to Facing the new situation after Inchon, however, the Soviets seemed willing to do more. When the Chinese discussed with the Soviets about possible Chinese-Soviet cooperation in intervening in Korea, the two sides, obviously following the spirit of the SinoSoviet alliance treaty, reached a general understanding that if the Chinese land forces entered the Korean War, the Soviet Union would send their air forces to Korea to provide an air umbrella for the Chinese. 86 Mao, who had been so inclined to send troops to Korea, had now a stronger basis to step forward. 82 We think this is a necessary step because if we allow Korea to be occupied by the Americans, the Korean revolutionary forces will be completely destroyed. We will then see the American invaders more rampant, which will be very unfavorable to the whole East. From 3-7 October, the CCP Politburo held a series of expanded meetings to discuss Mao's decision at Beijing. Mao dominated these meetings. As the person responsible for the decision to enter the Korean War, he clarified the case for intervention and rebutted opposition from his comrades. He and his supporters stated reasons for sending troops to Korea, emphasizing that the Korean problem concerned not only the security of China but also the fate of the confrontation between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp in the East. They also believed that comparing China's situation with that of the United States, China was superior in terms of manpower, moral strength, and support from the people, which would compensate for China's inferiority in terms of weapons and equipment. These meetings confirmed Mao's decision to send Chinese troops to Korea, and Peng Dehuai was selected as cadres of the 13th Army Corps, ordering them to complete preparations for battle in days. 94 At this stage, the Chinese troops, like an arrow on a bowstring, prepared to enter the battle.
The situation suddenly changed, however, at this juncture. At the same time Mao had issued orders to send Chinese troops into Korea , Zhou Enlai, together with interpreter Shi Zhe, had flown to the Soviet Union to finalize details of Chinese-Soviet military cooperation in Korea. 95 Joined by Lin Biao, a member of the CCP Politburo who went to Russia to receive medical treatment, and Wang Jiaxiang, Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Zhou met Stalin at a villa on the Black Sea on the evening of 9 October. 96 The meeting was a long one --lasting from 7 PM on 9 October to 5 AM the next morning. The meeting was supposed to focus on how many fighters and bombers the Soviet Union could send to Korea while the Chinese land forces entered the Korean War, and who should command Soviet air forces there. To the surprise of the Chinese, however, Stalin was now reluctant to dispatch Soviet air forces into Korea. He promised that the Soviet Union would deliver the Chinese military equipment for 20 divisions, but the Soviet air forces would not be sent into Korea because they needed more time to get ready. On learning the surprising Soviet change of heart, Zhou tried his best to change Stalin's mind, but without success. He urgently cabled to Beijing on 10 October informing Mao and the CCP leadership of the Soviet hesitancy and asking them to reconsider the decision to enter the Korean War. 97 This sudden Soviet change of heart caused serious problems for the Chinese leadership. Mao and other CCP leaders in Beijing now had to decide if they should go ahead on their own without the protection of the Soviet air umbrella. Mao cabled to Peng Dehuai and other leading figures in the Northeast area on the evening of 12 October, ordering the Thirteenth Army Corps to stop all movement. Peng and Gao were ordered to return to Beijing immediately to attend a politburo meeting. 98 The CCP politburo held an emergency meeting on 13 October to discuss whether China should intervene without Soviet air support. After an overnight meeting, they decided to go on, and Peng immediately called Xie Fang, chief of staff of the the CPV, asking CPV units to continue preparation for entering Korea. 99 After the meeting Mao cabled to Zhou:
... I have consulted with comrades in the Politburo. The consensus is that it is still advantageous to send our troops to Korea. At the initial stage of the war, we can concentrate on fighting the [South Korean] puppet army, for we may cope with the puppet army with certainty. We can establish bases in the vast mountainous areas north to the line between Wonsan and Pyongyang. This will encourage the Korean people. If we are able to eliminate several puppet divisions in this stage, the Korean situation would take a turn for our favor. The above positive policy will be very advantageous to China, to Korea, to the East, and even to the whole world. If we do not send off our troops, and allow the enemy to reach the Yalu River, the enemy will be swollen with arrogance. This will result in a variety of disadvantages to us, especially to the Northeast area. The whole Northeast Border Defense Army will be tied down there, and electric power in south Manchuria will be controlled [by the enemy]. In short, we think that we should enter the war; we have to enter the war. To enter the war will be very rewarding; not to enter the war will be extremely harmful. 100 At first glimpse, it is surprising that the CCP leadership reaffirmed its decision to intervene after the Soviet Union backed out of its commitment to provide air support.
According to several Chinese sources, even Stalin himself was surprised, and then greatly moved, when he learned the new decision made by Mao and the CCP leadership. 101 Considering Mao's deep commitment to revolution and China's security, however, this was a natural, or even inevitable, development. As Mao made clear in his telegram to Zhou, he believed that Korea's fate was related not only to the vital national security interests of China but the destiny of an Eastern and world revolution, of which the Chinese Communist revolution was an important part. Given his frame of reference, Mao had to enter the Korean War. This is why even a dramatic shift (such as Stalin's breaking his promise to provide air support) did not alter Mao's resolve.
But the sudden Soviet change inevitably left a stamp on the Chinese approach to intervene in the Korean War. Mao and the CCP leadership, facing the cruel fact that their troops would not be protected from air attack in Korea, were forced to further restrict the scope of their goals in the initial stage of the war. Mao telegraphed Zhou on 14 October, summarizing the CPV's strategy for the initial fighting: The CPV troops were to take a defensive position after entering Korea; they would establish a defensive perimeter, composed of two or three defense lines north to Pyongyang and Wonsan in order to keep bases as the starting point for future offensives. If UN troops attacked the perimeter in six months, they planned to wipe out the enemy before the perimeter; if UN troops did not initiate an offensive, the Chinese would not either. Only after all preparations were completed would they launch a counter-offensive toward Pyongyang and Wonsan. 102 The Soviet "betrayal" at this crucial juncture made clear to Mao and the CCP leadership the limitations of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The Chinese desperately needed Soviet support in any form at this moment, and Mao had no other choice but to swallow the fruit of the Russian betrayal. Mao, however, would never forgive it. We have every reason to believe that a seed of the future Sino-Soviet split had thus been sowed in the process of China's intervention in the Korean War.
After the CCP leadership decided to keep its original plan to enter the war, Peng Dehuai returned to Shenyang immediately. On the morning of 15 October, Mao cabled to Gao and Peng, instructing the CPV advanced units to cross the Yalu no later than 17 October. 103 On 16 October, Peng chaired a conference attended by division level cadres from the CPV. He conveyed the final decision of the Politburo, and announced that Chinese troops would move into Korea as soon as possible. He stressed that all units must be prepared for a difficult and protracted war. 104 Some CPV units on the China side of the Yalu received orders to cross the
